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In this paper we study semi-infinite transportation situations with infinitely divis-
ible goods and their corresponding (cooperative) transportation games. Special
attention is paid to conditions (if any) under which there exist core elements or
so-called ε-core elements of the transportation games.
In a (finite) transportation situation, units of a single indivisible good are
transported from a finite number of suppliers to a finite number of demanders. If
one unit of the good is transported from supplier i to demander j then this gives
these agents a benefit of tij units. Of course, a supplier cannot supply more goods
than he owns and a demander does not want to receive more units than she asked
for. The goal of the suppliers and the demanders is to maximize their total benefits
under these restrictions.
Sánchez-Soriano, López and Garcı́a-Jurado ([8]) studied the core of trans-
portation games, which are cooperative games arising from finite transportation
situations. They show that there always exists an optimal solution of the dual
linear program related to such a transportation situation. Any of these optimal
solutions generates a core element of the transportation game but the set of core
elements generated in this way need not exhaust the core.
Assignment situations are transportation situations where each supplier owns
one unit of the good and each demander wants one unit of the good. In a sense,
one is assigning a supplier to a demander and vice versa. Finite assignment
games were first studied by Shapley and Shubik ([9]). Llorca, Tijs and Timmer
([5]) studied a semi-infinite extension of these games, namely games related to
assignment situations with a countably infinite number of demanders. Other semi-
infinite games arising from different linear programming situations are studied by
Fragnelli, Patrone, Sideri and Tijs ([1]) and by Timmer, Llorca and Tijs ([10]).
A semi-infinite extension of transportation situations with indivisible goods
is studied by Sánchez-Soriano, Llorca, Tijs and Timmer ([7]). Using the results
of Llorca et al. ([5]), they show that the underlying infinite programs have no
duality gap and that the core of the corresponding game is nonempty. Kortanek
and Yamasaki ([3],[4]) also study semi-infinite transportation situations. The main
difference with our analysis is that they assume that the total supply and the total
demand for the good are equal (and consequently, finite) whereas we assume
nothing about these quantities. Our analysis includes situations where the total
supply is unequal to the total demand and situations with an infinite total demand.
Further, we study semi-infinite transportation situations from a game-theoretic
point of view, while they do not.
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In this paper we study semi-infinite transportation situations with infinitely
divisible goods and related games. These situations have a finite number of
suppliers and a countably infinite number of demanders. The good that will be
transported is assumed to be infinitely divisible. The goal of the suppliers and
demanders is to maximize their total benefit such that no supplier supplies too
much and any demander receives at most what she asked for. We start by showing
that the underlying primal and dual infinite programs have no duality gap. In the
proof of this result we need the corresponding result for semi-infinite transportation
situations with indivisible goods by Sánchez-Soriano et al. ([7]). After this, the
existence of so-called ε-core elements is shown. These are allocations of the
total benefit over all suppliers and demanders in such a way that the gain of a
subgroup of agents obtained by splitting off is at most ε, an arbitrarily small
positive number. Finally we consider two types of situations: those with finite or
infinite total demand. For both types of situations we show that there exist core
elements of the corresponding transportation games. For the second type we need
some conditions on the demands to achieve this result.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section we present
the main results for games arising from finite transportation situations and from
semi-infinite transportation situations with indivisible goods. In section 3, games
corresponding to semi-infinite transportation situations with infinitely divisible
goods are introduced. We show that the underlying infinite programs have no
duality gap. It is shown in section 4 that there always exist ε-core elements.
Next, we consider two types of situations. In section 5 we study situations
with a finite total demand. We prove that the core of the corresponding game
is nonempty. Finally, in section 6 we consider situations with an infinite total
demand. Conditions are provided under which the core of the corresponding
game is nonempty.
2 Transportation problems and games
A (finite) transportation problem describes a situation in which demands at several
locations for a certain indivisible good will be covered by supplies from other
locations. The total demand for the good need not equal the total supply of the
good. Transporting one unit of the good from a supply point to a demand point
generates a certain profit. The goal of the suppliers and demanders is to find a
transportation plan (how many of the good should be transported from any of the
supply points to any of the demand points) that maximizes the total profit.
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A transportation problem is a tuple (P,Q, T, s, d) where P and Q are respec-
tively the finite sets of supply points and demand points. The transport of one
unit of the good from supply point i to demand point j generates a profit of tij, a
non-negative real number. The matrix T = [tij]i∈P,j∈Q contains all the profits per
unit of the good. The supply at point i ∈ P equals si units of the good and the
demand at j ∈ Q is dj units where both si and dj are natural numbers. The vectors
s = {si}i∈P and d = {dj}j∈Q contain respectively the supplies and demands of
the good. For the sake of brevity we will use T to denote (P,Q, T, s, d).
A transportation planX = [xij]i∈P,j∈Q is a matrix where xij ≥ 0 is the number
of units of the good that will be transported from supply point i to demand point
j. A supply point i ∈ P can supply at most si units of the good,
∑
j∈Q xij ≤ si,
and a demand point j ∈ Q wants to receive at most dj units,
∑
i∈P xij ≤ dj. The
maximal profit that can be obtained in this situation is




∣∣∣∣∣∣X is a transportation plan
 .
A transportation plan X is also called a feasible solution for T . Such a solution
is optimal if it attains the maximal profit,
∑
(i,j)∈P×Q tijxij = vp(T ). It is well
known that if we allow xij to be a nonnegative real number instead of an integer
number then there exists an optimal integer solution.
Given a transportation problem T , the corresponding transportation game
(N,w) is a cooperative transferable utility (TU) game with player setN = P ∪Q.
Let S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅, be a coalition of players and define PS = P ∩ S and
QS = Q ∩ S. If S = PS or S = QS, there are either only suppliers or demanders
present, then no transport can take place and the worth w(S) of coalition S equals
zero. Otherwise, the worth w(S) depends upon the transportation plans for this
coalition. A transportation plan X(S) for coalition S is a transportation plan for






∣∣∣∣∣∣X(S) is a transportation plan for S

= vp(TS)
is the worth of coalition S. By convention w(∅) = 0.
In Sánchez-Soriano et al. ([7]) these finite transportation problems are extended
to semi-infinite transportation problems in which the set of demanders is the
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countably infinite set Q = IN (where IN is the set of natural numbers). Further si
and dj are natural numbers for all i ∈ P and j ∈ Q, and the matrixT = [tij]i∈P, j∈Q
is bounded, ‖T‖∞ := sup(i,j)∈P×Q |tij| < ∞. We call these discrete situations
since all the supplies and demands are integer numbers; we consider indivisible
goods. This kind of situation can appear, for example, if a good has to be
transported in containers from a finite set of warehouses to an infinite set of
potential consumers.
Associated to such a semi-infinite transportation problem is a semi-infinite
transportation game (N,w) with player set N = P ∪ Q. As before, the worth of





∣∣∣∣∣∣X(S) is a transportation plan for S

= vp(TS)
otherwise. If we allow xij to be a nonnegative real number then the dual problem








∣∣∣∣∣∣ui + vj ≥ tij, ui, vj ≥ 0 for all i ∈ P, j ∈ Q

with value vd(T ). Notice that the primal and dual programs have an infinite
number of variables and an infinite number of constraints. Sánchez-Soriano et al.
([7]) show that the primal and dual problem have the same value and that there
exist optimal solutions for D.
When thinking about how to share the profit among the suppliers and the
demanders, one can consider to share the profit according to an element in the core






i∈N xi = w(N) and∑
i∈S xi ≥ w(S) for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅
}
.
If a core-element x is proposed as a distribution of the total profit w(N), then
each coalition S will get at least as much as it can obtain on its own because∑
i∈S xi ≥ w(S). This implies that no coalition has an incentive to disagree with
this proposal. A concept related to the core is the so-called Owen set1, which is
1Owen ([6]) presents a method to find a nonempty subset of the core of a linear production






∣∣∣∣∣ ∃(u, v) optimal for D such that xk = skukif k ∈ P and xk = dkvk if k ∈ Q
}
.
An element of the Owen set is easy to find and it turns out to be an element of the
core of the corresponding transportation game as well, that is, Owen(T ) ⊂ C(w).
From now on, we will consider a more general type of semi-infinite trans-
portation problems in which the supplies si and the demands dj are positive real
numbers. We call these continuous situations. The underlying idea is to consider
infinitely divisible goods like, e.g., gas or electricity.
3 A no-duality-gap theorem
In this section we show that (semi-infinite) continuous transportation situations
have no duality gap, that is, vp(T ) = vd(T ).
Let T be a continuous transportation problem and let δ > 0 be a positive
number. We scale the problem T in units of δ and we use overestimates and
underestimates of the scaled supplies and demands to obtain two discrete trans-
portation problems T δ+ and T δ− that are related to T . With the help of these
discrete problems we can show the absence of a duality gap between the primal
and dual problems for T .
For a nonnegative real number a, the notations dae and bac stand for respec-
tively the upper and lower integer part of a. So, a− 1 ≤ bac ≤ a ≤ dae ≤ a+ 1
and bac , dae ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .}. The discrete problem T δ+, which refers to











, tδ+ij = δtij











, tδ−ij = δtij
for all i ∈ P and j ∈ Q. The values vp(T δ+) and vp(T δ−) are closely related to
the value vp(T ) as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 3.1 Let T be a continuous transportation problem and T δ+, T δ− the
associated discrete problems for δ > 0. Then the following inequalities hold.
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1. vp(T ) ≤ vp(T δ+) ≤ vp(T ) +mδ ‖T‖∞,
2. vp(T ) ≥ vp(T δ−) ≥ vp(T )−mδ ‖T‖∞.







, t′ij = δtij for all i ∈ P, j ∈ Q.
This problem is obtained from the original one by scaling into units of δ. So, both
T and T ′ have the same value, vp(T ) = vp(T ′).
Let X ′ be a feasible transportation plan for T ′, then it is also feasible for T δ+.
Therefore vp(T ′) ≤ vp(T δ+). On the other hand, in T δ+ we have at most m
units of the good more than in T ′ because of the overestimations, so vp(T δ+) will
exceed vp(T ′) with at most m ‖δT‖∞. Hence vp(T
δ+) ≤ vp(T ′) + m ‖δT‖∞ =
vp(T ) +mδ ‖T‖∞.
To show the second item, let X be a feasible transportation plan for T δ−.
Such a plan is also feasible for T ′ and therefore vp(T ′) ≥ vp(T δ−). On the
other hand, in T ′ we have at most m units of the good more than in T δ−, so
vp(T ′) will exceed vp(T δ−) with at most in m ‖δT‖∞. Hence vp(T ) = vp(T
′) ≤
vp(T δ−) +m ‖δT‖∞. 2
The next lemma shows that the dual value of the original problem is bounded
by the dual values of the related discrete problems.
Lemma 3.2 Let T be a continuous transportation problem and T δ+, T δ− the
associated discrete problems for δ > 0. Then
vd(T
δ−) ≤ vd(T ) ≤ vd(T
δ+).
Proof. Let T ′ be the continuous transportation problem as defined in the proof
of lemma 3.1. Notice that the dual programs related to T δ+, T ′ and T δ− have
the same sets of feasible solutions. For the coefficients of the objective functions










j . Also, we are dealing with
infimum problems, so vd(T δ−) ≤ vd(T ′) ≤ vd(T δ+).
We continue by showing vd(T ) = vd(T ′). Let (u, v) be a feasible solution for
D. Define the pair (u′, v′) by u
′
i = δui and v
′
j = δvj. Then (u
′, v′) is a feasible

















From this we conclude that vd(T ) = vd(T ′), which finishes the proof. 2
Now we present the main result in this section, which tell us that there is no
duality gap for continuous transportation problems.
Theorem 3.3 Let T be a continuous transportation problem. Then,
vp(T ) = vd(T ).
Proof. From part 2 in lemma 3.1 and weak duality, we know that
vp(T )−mδ ‖T‖∞ ≤ vp(T
δ−) ≤ vp(T ) ≤ vd(T ). (3.1)
On the other hand, from the previous lemma, the absence of duality gaps for
discrete problems (Sánchez-Soriano et al. [7]) and part 1 in lemma 3.1, we obtain
vd(T ) ≤ vd(T
δ+) = vp(T
δ+) ≤ vp(T ) +mδ ‖T‖∞ . (3.2)
The desired result is obtained from the observation that (3.1) and (3.2) hold for all
δ > 0. 2
4 Transportation games possess ε-core elements
Now we know that the primal and the dual programs of a continuous transportation
problem have the same value, we can look at the problem of the division of
vp(T ) = vd(T ) among the involved agents.
For an arbitrary TU game (N,w), where N is a finite or a countably infinite
player set and w : 2N → IR is a map assigning to each coalition S ⊂ N a real
number and w(∅) = 0, interesting reward allocations are ε-core elements, where
ε ≥ 0. We say that z ∈ IRN is an ε-core element of the game (N,w) if the








zi ≥ w(S)− ε for all S ⊂ N (4.2)
So, an ε-core element dividesw(N) among the players, and a coalition S can gain
at most ε by splitting off. An ε-core element with ε = 0 is called a core element.
Interesting questions for arbitrary games are: do there exist core elements and do
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there exist ε-core elements for each ε > 0? For finite transportation games the
answer to both questions is yes. For semi-infinite transportation games we will
give an affirmative answer to the second question in the theorem below. We do
not know the answer to the first question for general semi-infinite transportation
games. Partial affirmative answers are given in the sections 5 and 6.
To find an ε-core element, ε > 0, of the transportation game we will use
almost optimal solutions of the dual problem. This is done in the proof of the next
theorem.
Theorem 4.1 Let ε > 0 and let (N,w) be the cooperative game corresponding
to the continuous transportation problem T as defined earlier. Then there exists a
vector z ∈ IRN which is an ε-core element.
Proof. Ifw(N) = 0 then 0 ∈ IRN is an ε-core element for each ε ≥ 0. So, suppose
thatw(N) 6= 0. Take δ > 0 such that ε = (1+δ)−1δw(N). Let (u, v) ∈ IRP×IRQ





djvj ≤ (1 + δ)vd(T ).
We call (u, v) a δvd(T )-optimal solution of the dual transportation problem. Let





djvj = (1 + δ
′)vd(T ).
Define z ∈ IRN by zi = (1 + δ′)−1siui for all i ∈ P and zj = (1 + δ′)−1djvj for
all j ∈ Q. We claim that z is an ε-core element of the game (N,w). Clearly, the
efficiency condition (4.1) holds:∑
i∈N
zi = vd(T ) = vp(T ) = w(N)
where we use the no-gap result of theorem 3.3. To show condition (4.2), note first
that for S ⊂ P or S ⊂ Q we have
∑
i∈S zi ≥ 0 = w(S) ≥ w(S)− ε. Take S such


















≥ (1 + δ′)−1w(S) = w(S)− (1 + δ′)−1δ′w(S)
≥ w(S)− (1 + δ′)−1δ′w(N)
≥ w(S)− (1 + δ)−1δw(N) = w(S)− ε
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where the first inequality follows from w(S) = vp(TS) = vd(TS) ≤
∑
i∈PS siui +∑
i∈QS djvj. The second inequality follows from the monotonicity ofw: forS ⊂ U
we have w(S) = vp(TS) ≤ vp(TU) = w(U). The last inequality holds because the
function f(x) = (1 + x)−1x is increasing in x for x ≥ 0 and δ′ ≤ δ. We conclude
that (4.2) is satisfied for z, which finishes the proof. 2
5 Transportation problems with finite total demand
In this section we consider continuous transportation problems (P,Q, T, s, d) with
‖T‖∞ <∞ and also, without loss of generality, with si > 0 for all i ∈ P . Further
we put the following condition on the demands.




For this type of transportation problems we show that the core of the corresponding




∣∣∣ i ∈ P}
where a+ is shorthand for max {a, 0}, a ∈ IR. This fit map has the following
properties for all x, y ∈ IRP+, i ∈ P and j ∈ Q.
0 ≤ fj(x) ≤ ‖T‖∞ (5.2)
xi + fj(x) ≥ tij (5.3)
|fj(x)− fj(y)| ≤ ‖y − x‖∞ := max {|yi − xi| | i ∈ P} (5.4)
Condition (5.4) follows from the observation
− |yi − xi| ≤ (tij − xi)+ − (tij − yi)+ ≤ |yi − xi|
for all j ∈ Q. From (5.4) we can deduce for all x, y ∈ IRP+
‖f(x)− f(y)‖∞ ≤ ‖y − x‖∞ (5.5)
where ‖a‖∞ := sup {|aj| | j ∈ Q} for all a ∈ IR
Q. From (5.2) and (5.3) follows
that the vector (x, f(x)) ∈ IRP+× IR
Q
+ is a feasible solution of the dual programD
for all x ∈ IRP+. Furthermore,
vj ≥ fj(u) for all feasible solutions (u, v) for D and all j ∈ Q. (5.6)
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The theorem below shows the nonemptiness of the core of a transportation game
in this setting.
Theorem 5.1 Let T be a continuous transportation problem with ‖T‖∞ < ∞,
s > 0, and ‖d‖1 < ∞. Then the corresponding transportation game (N,w) has
C(w) 6= ∅.
Proof. For each ε ∈ (0, 1] take an ε-optimal solution (u(ε), v(ε)) of D (see the







djvj(ε) ≤ vd(T ) + ε.
In view of (5.6) we can assume that v(ε) = f(u(ε)). Take a decreasing sequence
ε(1), ε(2), . . . in (0, 1] that converges to 0 such that the sequence u(ε(1)), u(ε(2)),
. . . converges to, say, ū. This is possible because the set {u(ε)| ε ∈ (0, 1]} is
a subset of
{
a ∈ IRP+ |
∑
i∈P siai ≤ vd(T ) + 1
}
, which is a compact2 set. Then
limk→∞ u(ε(k)) = ū holds as a limit with respect to the ‖·‖∞-norm. Let z ∈ IR
N
be defined by zi = siūi for all i ∈ P and zj = djfj(ū) for all j ∈ Q. We show
that z is a core element of (N,w).
First note that by (5.5)
lim
k→∞
‖(u(ε(k)), f(u(ε(k))))− (ū, f(ū))‖∞ = 0
where ‖(a, b)‖∞ = max {‖a‖∞ , ‖b‖∞} for a ∈ IR
P , b ∈ IRQ. Since the set of
feasible solutions of D is closed with respect to ‖·‖∞-limits we conclude that









It remains to show that the efficiency condition (4.1) holds for z, that is,
∑
k∈N zk =





djfj(ū) = vp(T ).







djfj(u(ε(k))) ≤ vp(T ) + ε.
2This follows from s > 0.
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 = 0. (5.7)
The absolute value of the expression behind the limit is at most equal to
(
∑





≤ (‖s‖1 + ‖d‖1) ‖u(ε(k))− ū‖∞
where the inequality follows from (5.5). Now (5.7) follows from (5.1) and from
limk→∞ ‖u(ε(k))− ū‖∞ = 0. 2
6 Transportation problems with infinite total de-
mand
In this section we consider semi-infinite continuous transportation problems T
with infinite total demand,
∑
j∈Q dj =∞, such that
dj ≥ η > 0 for all j ∈ Q. (6.1)
We assume that all demanders in Q want to receive at least the positive amount η.
We can interpret this amount η as the minimal useful amount of the good. Our goal
is to prove that the core of the corresponding transportation game is nonempty.
We achieve this result in various steps, starting with a procedure to look for a finite
transportation problem that is closely related to T .
Given a problem T as above, a demander j0 is called a good isolated demander
for a supply point i if |{j|tij ≥ tij0}| < ∞. We denote the set of good isolated
demanders for i by GID(i). For each supplier i we introduce a number ti using
the set GID(i). Two cases can arise:
a. If GID(i) = ∅, then ti = 0.













where Ti refers to ({i}, Q, [tij]j∈Q,
∑
h∈P sh, d) and T
k
i to the problem
({i}, {1, 2, ..., k}, [tij]kj=1,
∑
h∈P sh, (d1, ..., dk)).
12
Now, define t∗ = maxi∈P ti. Closely related to T is the finite transportation




tij, j ≤ t∗,
sup {tik|k ≥ t∗ + 1} , j = t∗ + 1.
The demand vector d̄, which has t∗+ 1 entries, is defined by d̄j = dj if j ≤ t∗ and
d̄t∗+1 =
∑
h∈P sh + 1. The example below illustrates this method.
Example 6.1 Consider the semi-infinite transportation situation (P,Q, T, s, d)
with P = {1, 2, 3, 4}, Q = {1, 2, . . .}, d = (2.3, 5, 5, 5, 1.7, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1, . . .),
s = (2, 1.1, 4.4, 3) and with T as below.
2.3 5 5 5 1.7 3 2 1 1 1 1 · · · dj
2 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 · · ·
1.1 8 1 31
2






























3 1 6 7 6 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 · · ·
si
= T
In this situation we have GID(1) = ∅, GID(2) = {1, 5, 6}, GID(3) = ∅ and
GID(4) = {2, 3, 4}. Consequently, t1 = t3 = 0. To determine t2 we notice that∑
h∈P sh = 10.5 > d1 + d5 + d6 = 7. Thus t2 = max{j|j ∈ GID(2)} = 6.
Finally, for t4 we have
∑
h∈P sh = 10.5 < d2 + d3 + d4 = 15. Hence, t4 =
min{k ∈ Q|vp(T4) = vp(T k4 )} with
T4 :
2.3 5 5 5 1.7 3 2 1 1 1 1 · · · dj
10.5 1 6 7 6 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 · · ·∑
h∈P sh
,
so, t4 = 4. Now t∗ = max{0, 6, 0, 4} = 6 and
T̄ :
2.3 5 5 5 1.7 3 11.5 d̄j
2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
1.1 8 1 31
2










3 1 6 7 6 2 1 2
si
is the finite transportation problem related to T .
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Lemma 6.1 Let T be a transportation problem as defined above, and let T̄ be the
corresponding finite transportation problem. Then,
vp(T ) = vp(T̄ ).
Proof. Let X be a feasible plan for T . Define the plan X̄ for T̄ as follows:
x̄ij =
{
xij, j ≤ t∗,∑∞
k=t∗+1 xik, j = t
∗ + 1.































For any feasible planX for T there exists a feasible plan X̄ for T̄ with a value that
is equal or larger. Hence, vp(T̄ ) ≥ vp(T ).
Next, we show that vp(T ) ≥ vp(T̄ )−ε for all ε > 0. Without loss of generality
assume that
∑
i∈P si > 0. Let ε > 0, let i ∈ P and let X̄ be an optimal solution
for T̄ . Define the plan X for T by xij = x̄ij, j ≤ t∗. If x̄i(t∗+1) = 0 then
define xij = 0 for all j > t∗. Otherwise there exists a finite set of demanders
K ⊂ Q such that
∑
j∈K dj ≥ x̄i(t∗+1) and for all j ∈ K it holds that j > t
∗ and
tij ≥ t̄i(t∗+1) − ε/
∑
i∈P si. This finite set K exists because of condition (6.1).
Now we can divide the amount x̄i(t∗+1) over the demanders inK in a feasible way.




































x̄ij t̄ij − ε.
We conclude that vp(T ) ≥ vp(T̄ )− ε for all ε > 0. 2
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Example 6.2 For the situation in example 6.1 we have vp(T ) = s1t12 + s2t21 +
s3 supj∈Q t3j + s4t43 = 48.6 and vp(T̄ ) = s1t̄12 + s2t̄21 + s3t̄37 + s4t̄43 = 48.6.
The following example indicates that condition (6.1) is necessary in lemma 6.1.
Example 6.3 Let T be the transportation problem with P = {1}, Q = N and








1 · · · dj








1 · · ·
si
= T
In this situation the total demand is infinite and infj∈Q dj = 0. Hence, condi-
tion (6.1), dj ≥ η > 0, j ∈ Q, does not hold. The value of T is











which lies in-between 2 and 3. The core of the corresponding one-person game
is C(w) = {vp(T )}. From GID(1) = ∅ we obtain t∗ = t1 = 0. The finite





with value vp(T̄ ) = 4. We conclude that vp(T ) 6= vp(T̄ ).
The lemma below shows that any optimal solution forD(T̄ ), the dual problem
related to T̄ , has a special property.
Lemma 6.2 Let T be a transportation problem as above, and T̄ the corresponding
finite problem. If (ū, v̄) is optimal for D(T̄ ) then v̄t∗+1 = 0.
Proof. Since T̄ is a finite problem we know that there exist optimal solutions for
D(T̄ ) and for T̄ itself. Let (ū, v̄) be optimal for D(T̄ ) and let X̄ be an optimal


































Together with (6.2) we conclude that v̄t∗+1 = 0. 2
With this result we can show that there exists an optimal solution for the dual
problem related to T .
Theorem 6.3 Let T be a transportation problem as above. Then there exists an
optimal solution for D(T ).
Proof. Let T be a transportation problem with infinite demand and T̄ the corre-
sponding finite problem. Let (ū, v̄) be optimal for D(T̄ ). So,{
ūi + v̄j ≥ t̄ij = tij, i ∈ P, j ≤ t∗,
ūi + v̄t∗+1 ≥ t̄i(t∗+1) = sup {tij|j ≥ t∗ + 1} , i ∈ P.
From lemma 6.2 we know v̄t∗+1 = 0. Define α(v̄) = (v̄1, . . . , v̄t∗, 0, 0, . . .). Then
ūi ≥ sup {tij : j ≥ t∗ + 1} which implies ūi + α(v̄)j ≥ tij for all i ∈ P and
j ≥ t∗ + 1. Hence, (ū, α(v̄)) is a feasible solution for D(T ).
According to lemma 6.1













djα(v̄)j ≥ vd(T ) = vp(T )
where the inequality follows from (ū, α(v̄)) being a feasible solution for D(T ).





djα(v̄)j = vd(T ),
the solution (ū, α(v̄)) is optimal for D(T ). 2
Finally, we are able to show that the corresponding cooperative game has a
nonempty core.
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Theorem 6.4 Let T be a transportation problem as above and (N,w) its corre-
sponding game. Then the core of this game, C(w), is a nonempty set.
Proof. From theorem 6.3 we know that there exists an optimal solution forD(T ).
Let (u, v) be such an optimal solution. Define the vector x by xk = skuk for
k ∈ P and xk = dkvk for k ∈ Q. Then x ∈Owen(T ) ⊂ C(w). 2
Example 6.4 Consider once again the semi-infinite transportation situation in
example 6.1. An optimal solution for D(T̄ ) is (ū, v̄) with ū = (5, 8, 2, 7) and
v̄ = (0, . . . , 0). Then (ū, α(v̄)) is optimal for D(T ) with α(v̄) = (0, 0, . . .).
According to the previous theorem, the vector x = ((10, 8.8, 8.8, 21), (0, 0, . . .))
is an element of the core C(w).
As example 6.3 shows the procedure used in this section to find core elements
cannot be used to prove that the core of a more general semi-infinite continuous
transportation game with infinite total demand is nonempty. An alternative ap-
proach could be the one described in section 5, but it fails because the total demand
is infinite. So, it remains an open question whether the core is nonempty for games
corresponding to continuous transportation situations with infinite total demand
and without a positive lower bound on the demands.
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